But this phaenomenon likewise depends upon the same
principle. For why do we blame all gross and injurious language, unless
it be, because we esteem it contrary to good breeding and humanity? And
why is it contrary, unless it be more shocking than any delicate satire?
The rules of good breeding condemn whatever is openly disobliging, and
gives a sensible pain and confusion to those, with whom we converse.
After this is once established, abusive language is universally blam'd, and
gives less pain upon account of its coarseness and incivility, which
render the person despicable, that employs it. It becomes less
disagreeable, merely because originally it is more so; and 'tis more
disagreeable, because it affords an inference by general and common
rules, that are palpable and undeniable.
To this explication of the different influence of open and conceal'd
flattery or satire, I shall add the consideration of another phenomenon,
which is analogous to it. There are many particulars in the point of
honour both of men and women, whose violations, when open and
avow'd, the world never excuses, but which it is more apt to overlook,
when the appearances are sav'd, and the transgression is secret and
conceal'd. Even those, who know with equal certainty, that the fault is
committed, pardon it more easily, when the proofs seem in some
measure oblique and equivocal, than when they are direct and
undeniable. The same idea is presented in both cases, and, properly
speaking, is equally assented to by the judgment; and yet its influence is
different, because of the different manner, in which it is presented.
Now if we compare these two cases, of the open and conceal'd violations
of the laws of honour, we shall find, that the difference betwixt them
consists in this, that in the first ease the sign, from which we infer the
blameable action, is single, and suffices alone to be the foundation of our
reasoning and judgment; whereas in the latter the signs are numerous,
and decide little or nothing when alone and unaccompany'd with many
minute circumstances, which are almost imperceptible. But 'tis certainly
true, that any reasoning is always the more convincing, the more single
and united it is to the eye, and the less exercise it gives to the imagination
to collect all its parts, and run from them to the correlative idea, which
forms the conclusion. The labour of the thought disturbs the regular
progress of the sentiments, as we shall observe presently.(24) The idea
strikes not on us with ouch vivacity; and consequently has no such
influence on the passion and imagination.
From the same principles we may account for those observations of the
CARDINAL DE RETZ, that there are many things, in which the world
wishes to be deceiv'd; and that it more easily excuses a person in acting
than in talking contrary to the decorum of his profession and character.
A fault in words is commonly more open and distinct than one in
actions, which admit of many palliating excuses, and decide not so clearly
concerning the intention and views of the actor.
Thus it appears upon the whole, that every kind of opinion or judgment,
which amounts not to knowledge, is deriv'd entirely from the force and
vivacity of the perception, and that these qualities constitute in the mind,
what we call the BELIEF Of the existence of any object. This force and
this vivacity are most conspicuous in the memory; and therefore our
confidence in the veracity of that faculty is the greatest imaginable, and
equals in many respects the assurance of a demonstration. The next
degree of these qualities is that deriv'd from the relation of cause and
effect; and this too is very great, especially when the conjunction is found
by experience to be perfectly constant, and when the object, which is
present to us, exactly resembles those, of which we have had experience.
But below this degree of evidence there are many others, which have an
influence on the passions and imagination, proportioned to that degree
of force and vivacity, which they communicate to the ideas. 'Tis by habit
we make the transition from cause to effect; and 'tis from some present
impression we borrow that vivacity, which we diffuse over the correlative
idea. But when we have not observ'd a sufficient number of instances, to
produce a strong habit; or when these instances are contrary to each
other; or when the resemblance is not exact; or the present impression is
faint and obscure; or the experience in some measure obliterated from
the memory; or the connexion dependent on a long chain of objects; or
the inference deriv'd from general rules, and yet not conformable to
them: In all these cases the evidence diminishes by the diminution of the
force and intenseness of the idea. This therefore is the nature of the
judgment and probability.,
What principally gives authority to this system is, beside the undoubted
arguments, upon which each part is founded, the agreement of these
parts, and the necessity of one to explain another. The belief, which
attends our memory, is of the same nature with that, which is deriv'd
from our judgments: Nor is there any difference betwixt that judgment,
which is deriv'd from a constant and uniform connexion of causes and
effects, and that which depends upon an interrupted and uncertain. 'Tis
indeed evident, that in all determinations, where the mind decides from
contrary experiments, 'tis first divided within itself, and has an
inclination to either side in proportion to the number of experiments we
have seen and remember. This contest is at last determin'd to the
advantage of that side, where we observe a superior number of these
experiments; but still with a diminution of force in the evidence
correspondent to the number of the opposite experiments. Each
possibility, of which the probability is compos'd, operates separately
upon the imagination; and 'tis the larger collection of possibilities, which
at last prevails, and that with a force proportionable to its superiority. All
these phenomena lead directly to the precedent system; nor will it ever be
possible upon any other principles to give a satisfactory and consistent
explication of them. Without considering these judgments as the effects
of custom on the imagination, we shall lose ourselves in perpetual
contradiction and absurdity.
SECT. XIV.
Of the Idea of Necessary Connexion.
Having thus explain'd the manner, in which we reason beyond our
immediate impressions, and conclude that such particular causes must
have such particular effects; we must now return upon our footsteps to
examine that question, which(25) first occur'd to us, and which we dropt in
our way, viz. What is our idea of necessity, when we say that two objects
are necessarily connected together. Upon this head I repeat what I have