For more than 50 years, the U.S. military has run the IMET program to provide opportunities for foreign personnel to attend U.S. military schools and courses. Most of these commissioned officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) receive English language training before attending the U.S. courses. In the case of Latin American armed forces, the United States operates courses in Spanish.
Contractor Support
6−19. In some cases, additional training support from contractors enables commanders to use Soldiers and Marines more efficiently. Contractor support can provide HN training and education, including the following: Institutional training.
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Developing security ministries and headquarters.
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Establishing administrative and logistic systems.
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Contracted police development capabilities through the Department of State's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs can provide expertise not resident in the uniformed military.
Organizing U.S. Forces to Develop Host−Nation Security Forces
6−20. Developing HN security forces is a complex and challenging mission. The United States and multinational partners can only succeed if they approach the mission with the same deliberate planning and preparation, energetic execution, and appropriate resourcing as the combat aspects of the COIN operation.
Accordingly, COIN force commanders and staffs need to consider the task of developing HN security forces during their initial mission analysis. They must make that task an integral part of all assessments, planning, 140
The U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual coordination, and preparation.
6−21. As planning unfolds, mission requirements should drive the initial organization for the unit charged with developing security forces. To achieve unity of effort, a single organization should receive this responsibility.
6−22. For small−scale COIN efforts, SOF may be the only forces used. SOF organizations may be ideally suited for developing security forces through the FID portion of their doctrinal mission.
6−23. If only a single component (land, maritime, air, or special operations) is being developed, commanders can assign the mission to a single−Service task force. For example, if the host nation requires a maritime capability to guard oil distribution platforms, a Navy task force may receive the mission.
6−24. In an area in which COIN operations are already underway, developing security forces can be assigned to a specific unit, such as a brigade combat team, division, or Marine air−ground task force.
6−25. For large, multi−Service, long−duration missions, a separate organization with the sole responsibility of developing security forces and subordinate to the COIN force commander may be required.
Such an organization may be multi−Service, multinational, and interagency.
Table 6−1. Staff functions required when training host−nation security forces 6−26. The internal structure of the organization charged with developing security forces must reflect the desired end state of those security forces. For example, if army, police, air, naval, and special operations capabilities are being developed, the organization in charge of those programs requires teams charged specifically with each of those tasks. If civilian security components, such as a ministry of defense or interior, are being developed, then ministerial teams are needed. Developing security forces in terms of professionalism and ethics is important; a separate element focused on training those values may be needed.
6−27. The U.S. or multinational force responsible for these programs requires a headquarters and staff task−organized for the functions required to support all aspects of developing the security forces. (See paragraph 6−31.) In addition to traditional staff functions, some or all of functions listed in table 6−1 (page 6−5) may require augmentation.
6−28. An effective security force development organization is flexible and adaptive. Requirements for developing the type, character, composition, and quantity of security forces change as security forces grow and the COIN operation matures. The organization must anticipate such changes, since joint manning document procedures and requests for forces have limited responsiveness. Temporary duty and contract personnel may provide support to fill gaps until more permanent individuals or units arrive.
DESIRED END STATE