Whether he would or would not be able, I said, is not to the
point. My question is only whether the just man, while refus-
ing to have more than another just man, would wish and claim
to have more than the unjust?
Yes, he would.
And what of the unjust--does he claim to have more than
the just man and to do more than is just?
Of course, he said, for he claims to have more than all men.
And the unjust man will strive and struggle to obtain more
than the just man or action, in order that he may have more
than all?
True.
We may put the matter thus, I said--the just does not desire
more than his like, but more than his unlike, whereas the un-
just desires more than both his like and his unlike?
Nothing, he said, can be better than that statement.
And the unjust is good and wise, and the just is neither?
Good again, he said.
And is not the unjust like the wise and good, and the just
unlike them?
Of course, he said, he who is of a certain nature, is like those
who are of a certain nature; he who is not, not.
Each of them, I said, is such as his like is?
Certainly, he replied.
Very good, Thrasymachus, I said; and now to take the case
of the arts: you would admit that one man is a musician and
another not a musician?
Yes.
And which is wise and which is foolish?
Clearly the musician is wise, and he who is not a musician is
foolish.
And he is good in as far as he is wise, and bad in as far as
he is foolish?
Yes.
And you would say the same sort of thing of the physician?
Yes.
And do you think, my excellent friend, that a musician when
he adjusts the lyre would desire or claim to exceed or go be-
yond a musician in the tightening and loosening the strings?
I do not think that he would.
But he would claim to exceed the non-musician?
Of course.
And what would you say of the physician? In prescribing
meats and drinks would he wish to go beyond another physician
or beyond the practice of medicine?
He would not.
But he would wish to go beyond the non-physician?
Yes.
And about knowledge and ignorance in general; see whether
you think that any man who has knowledge ever would wish to
have the choice of saying or doing more than another man who
has knowledge. Would he not rather say or do the same as his
like in the same case?
That, I suppose, can hardly be denied.
And what of the ignorant? would he not desire to have more
than either the knowing or the ignorant?
I dare say.
And the knowing is wise?
Yes.
And the wise is good?
True.
Then the wise and good will not desire to gain more than his
like, but more than his unlike and opposite?
I suppose so.
Whereas the bad and ignorant will desire to gain more than
both?
Yes.
But did we not say, Thrasymachus, that the unjust goes be-
yond both his like and unlike? Were not these your words?
They were.
And you also said that the just will not go beyond his like,
but his unlike?
Yes.
Then the just is like the wise and good, and the unjust like
the evil and ignorant?
That is the inference.
And each of them is such as his like is?
That was admitted.
Then the just has turned out to be wise and good, and the
unjust evil and ignorant.
Thrasymachus made all these admissions, not fluently, as I
repeat them, but with extreme reluctance; it was a hot sum-
mer's day, and the perspiration poured from him in torrents;
and then I saw what I had never seen before, Thrasymachus
blushing. As we were now agreed that justice was virtue and
wisdom, and injustice vice and ignorance, I proceeded to an-
other point:
Well, I said, Thrasymachus, that matter is now settled; but
were we not also saying that injustice had strength--do you
remember?
Yes, I remember, he said, but do not suppose that I approve
of what you are saying or have no answer; if, however, I were
to answer, you would be quite certain to accuse me of harangu-
ing; therefore either permit me to have my say out, or if you
would rather ask, do so, and I will answer "Very good," as
they say to story-telling old women, and will nod "Yes" and
"No."
Certainly not, I said, if contrary to your real opinion.
Yes, he said, I will, to please you, since you will not let me
speak. What else would you have?
Nothing in the world, I said; and if you are so disposed I
will ask and you shall answer.
Proceed.
Then I will repeat the question which I asked before, in order
that our examination of the relative nature of justice and in-
justice may be carried on regularly. A statement was made
that injustice is stronger and more powerful than justice, but
now justice, having been identified with wisdom and virtue,
is easily shown to be stronger than injustice, if injustice is ig-
norance; this can no longer be questioned by anyone. But I
want to view the matter, Thrasymachus, in a different way:
You would not deny that a State may be unjust and may be
unjustly attempting to enslave other States, or may have already
enslaved them, and may be holding many of them in subjection?
True, he replied; and I will add that the best and most per-
fectly unjust State will be most likely to do so.
I know, I said, that such was your position; but what I would
further consider is, whether this power which is possessed by
the superior State can exist or be exercised without justice or
only with justice.
If you are right in your view, and justice is wisdom, then
only with justice; but if I am right, then without justice.
I am delighted, Thrasymachus, to see you not only nodding
assent and dissent, but making answers which are quite excel-
lent.
That is out of civility to you, he replied.
You are very kind, I said; and would you have the goodness
also to inform me, whether you think that a State, or an army,
or a band of robbers and thieves, or any other gang of evil-
doers could act at all if they injured one another?
No, indeed, he said, they could not.
But if they abstained from injuring one another, then they
might act together better?
Yes.
And this is because injustice creates divisions and hatreds
and fighting, and justice imparts harmony and friendship; is
not that true, Thrasymachus?
I agree, he said, because I do not wish to quarrel with you.
How good of you, I said; but I should like to know also
whether injustice, having this tendency to arouse hatred, wher-
ever existing, among slaves or among freemen, will not make
them hate one another and set them at variance and render them
incapable of common action?
Certainly.
And even if injustice be found in two only, will they not